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The Challenge of Radicalisation: a public health approach to understanding and 
intervention 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Radicalisation is the term proposed to explain how an apparently ordinary person 
can be transformed from a law-abiding citizen into a supporter of violent protest. It 
refers to a process of belief modification and requires a progression from feeling 
sympathy towards violence for a political goal to direct involvement in such 
activities. This paper explores the reasons why individuals are drawn to extreme 
movements and how approaches devised for public health can be applied to 
prevention. We argue for interventions at an early stage when ideas are beginning to 
take root in people vulnerable to the recruiter’s message, and identify both 
protective and risk factors. 
 
  
  
Introduction 
Since 9/11 the focus on terrorism and its prevention is central to government 
initiatives around the world, whether high- or low-income countries, or whether 
dominated by  radical  religious belief systems or practices, or secular right-wing 
movements (Frank, 2005) (Felton, 2004). Terrorism undermines societies and  
institutions  by killing civilians and diverting resources, especially in low-income 
countries, from other important humanitarian, health and welfare  programmes 
(Goldman, 2002)((Bhui, Hicks, Lashley, & Jones, 2012). Whilst governments have 
introduced measures designed to address radicalisation (in the UK Contest  includes 
a Prevent programme, whilst Channel is designed to counter beliefs and actions 
likely to lead to violent protest), there remains less emphasis on understanding the 
roots of disaffection and grievances with democratic processes than with the 
detection of terrorists and terrorist organisations (HMGovernment, 2011). This 
paper explores a range of ideas proposed to explain the power of radical 
philosophies and why they are so appealing to groups of young people to the extent 
that many are willing to sacrifice their lives.   
  
An evolving context 
War and conflict have focused attention on psychological trauma.  The reified 
concept of post-traumatic stress has helped  to justify access to health care for  
asylum seekers and refugees, civilians  exposed to war  but trapped  in  conflict 
zones,  veterans returning from combat, and those that are victims of physical 
assault, crime, rape, or violent attack, or natural disasters (Jacobs, Burns, & Gross, 
2003). Terrorism is now added to this list of trauma, both for its direct effects on 
those at the heart of a bombing  or determined attack, and for its indirect effects 
through the fear invoked in family and friends of victims,  citizens and witnesses, 
including children and young people for whom terrorism is  mentioned daily in the 
news channels (Rousseau & Measham, 2004). Yet terrorism is not only an individual 
experience but also a group one, designed to undermine   core democratic and 
pluralistic values  and replace them with  ‘higher’ causes that do not always seek 
rational earthly solutions or goals  that political compromise might deliver (Atran, 
2003).  Many  recent terrorist attacks are directed towards events and activities 
where people express freedoms: a gay nightclub in Orlando, a Jewish supermarket in 
Paris, or the Copenhagen shootings at a public afternoon event called ‘Art, 
Blasphemy and Freedom of Expression’ and the killing of a Jewish security guard 
outside the city’s Great Synagogue in February 2015 (Anderson, 2016). Although 
individual people are targets, the goal of most terrorists are politically or culturally 
recognisable groups, including governments (Alderdice, 2009; Gostin, 2002).  
 
Yet, what do we know about the causes of terrorism in order to prevent it?  
Generally, it is thought that there are socially-strained contexts in which terrorism 
emerges as a possible option for those feeling disempowered (Leiken, 2016), but this 
still does not fully explain the chosen methods and their extreme and violent nature. 
The chosen method may reflect a politically isolated minority (usually) to wage (an 
unequal) war with those in power to change the political decisions of those in power 
and to disrupt ordinary processes of government and governance. Instilling fear in 
citizens is part of that process (Leistedt, 2016; McGilloway, Ghosh, & Bhui, 2015). 
This inequality in power,  ostensibly a weaker authority attacking a larger more 
powerful one, is given prominence in the narratives of terrorists to justify the 
atrocities, killings, and the persistent disruption to society (O'Shaughnessy & Baines, 
2009). Yet at the same time, recent claims from IS (Islamic State) and al-Qaeda is 
that they are larger authorities themselves, seeking to subvert a whole political and 
religious system and to exchange it for their own; the active and rapid pace of 
communications, the levels of resources, and use of persuasive device 
(technological, digital and dramatic) are alarming and distinct from previous terrorist 
groups (Bhui & Ibrahim, 2013) (Neumann, 2016). 
  
Justifications for such acts include religious ideology, even if this falls well outside an 
orthodox interpretation of faith,  political discrimination  and powerlessness such 
that the subjects’ only option is action that includes  violence (Atran, 2003; Baines et 
al., 2010). However, many people feel aggrieved but choose democratic and non-
violent political protest; and even where protest becomes violent, for example, riots 
in North London by black youth,  order was quickly restored whilst lessons are learnt. 
Yet, terrorism persists and the so-called ‘fifth wave’ under the auspices of  extreme 
Muslim groups, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, have assumed  a  brutal and 
repressive character, using  technologically advanced communications and 
persuasive technologies to recruit and persuade.  These narratives  seek to frame  
terrorist actions in a context of righteousness and the protection of the broader 
Muslim faith, appealing  to individuals, often young and impressionable,  looking for 
a purpose and meaning in their lives, a political search for belonging rather than a 
social or health malady (McGarry, 2016). 
  
Mental illness and terrorism 
Mental illness is a global problem, even in high income countries, and yet only 
between a quarter and a third of those with a common psychological disorder 
receive any form of treatment; the  poor provision of services is more marked for 
those with psychosis, but in lower income countries the indices are far worse, with 
very little spent on mental health of citizens. Terrorism is known to inflict 
experiences of loss and trauma, and so is often, like conflict and war in general, 
associated with depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress, or abnormally long and 
complex experiences of grief. However, mental health experts have recently turned 
their attention to prevention of terrorism by trying to understand the motivations 
and sentiments of those recruited to undertake violent acts against innocent 
civilians. Historically, terrorism has been broadly recognised as a political act with 
little relationship to mental illness other than causing mass group and individual 
distress.  However, the recent phenomena of citizens of Western democracies taking 
up terrorist causes in the countries in which they were educated, or seeking out 
terrorist networks in Syria or Iraq or Afghanistan, have raised questions about who is 
susceptible to recruitment narratives.  So understanding psychological processes by 
which individuals align with extremist thinking and are motivated to act violently is a 
key issue for modern democracies. Another growing concern is that some people 
who already appear to suffer emotional distress or frank mental illness may be 
particularly at risk from terrorist propaganda. More specifically, lone actors, those 
not belonging to any terror networks in a command and control manner, but  who  
nonetheless appear to act on behalf of a terrorist cause, are thought to be more 
likely to suffer from mental illness (Corner & Gill, 2015).  
  
Our work has sought to understand prevention through  the very early phases of 
radicalisation,  following the analysis of New York 9/11 perpetrators  (Silber & Bhatt, 
2007). That is, how might we stop people early in the trajectory of becoming 
involved in violent acts of terrorism, long before they have even considered violence 
as an action? This is not popular work nor always well received as some believe that 
this approach inadvertently mitigates  the gravity of terrorist offences by explaining 
them in terms of understandable psychological processes and even mental illness 
that might then attract a legal defence. Others argued that we risked stigmatizing 
those with psychological disorders, already perceived in the public imagination as 
dangerous, such that people with mental illnesses would worry about receiving 
treatment and their close companions  would fear them more.  Other objections to 
such work include the notion  that terrorism is fundamentally a political issue 
relating to security and should be addressed through domestic and international 
policy by  counter-terrorism agencies.  
 
The existing government strategy, strong and successful as it is on preventing 
incidents by high-risk individuals linked to specific groups, does not consider 
prevention at the earliest phases. In September 2016, the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists’  position statement emphasised  that the evidence upon which public 
bodies are asked to change practice to protect individuals at risk of being drawn into 
terrorism is limited (http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/PS04_16.pdf). The statement 
also observed that safeguarding is already taking place in the context of good 
psychiatric practice, and that managing risk is already a well-established part of 
mental health care. Furthermore, in the context of terrorism risk, prediction tools 
are doomed to fail given the rarity of the terrorist events.  In anticipation of this 
evidential context from 2008 onwards, Bhui, Jones, and others began to explore 
public health approaches to radicalisation, the process proposed to explain the 
engagement of ordinary young people in terrorist causes. Does radicalisation exist? 
Is it measurable? Our research efforts aimed to explore this, but in close 
collaboration with communities who were already complaining that government 
strategy excluded them and perhaps even diminished their role as suspect 
communities. 
  
 
Public Health 
Whilst acts of terrorism remain mercifully rare, they are dwarfed by public health 
problems such as TB, infectious diseases, accidents and death from road accidents or 
due to cancer, obesity or heart disease. Although there has been a dramatic increase 
in the last six months in the numbers of people killed by terrorist attacks in the UK, 
which have rightly caused widespread alarm and concern, since 7/7 there have been 
only been, at the time of writing,  39 deaths as a result of terrorism within the UK: 
Mohammed Saleem, a 82-year old Muslim stabbed by Pavlo Lapshyn, a 25-year old 
Ukrainian student in April 2013, Private Lee Rigby stabbed in May 2013 by Michael 
Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale near the Royal Artillery Barracks in Woolwich,  Jo 
Cox killed by Thomas Mair in June 2016, the five who died on Westminster Bridge in 
March 2017, 22 killed by a suicide bomber in Manchester, eight killed in the London 
Bridge in attack, and one person in an attack at a mosque in Finsbury Park in June 
2017.  The rarity of terrorist acts makes it very difficult for any science of risk 
prediction or prevention to be certain about preventive capability. However, we also 
know that terrorists are technologically advanced and adaptive, so that whatever 
preventive efforts are introduced, they are rapidly superseded by events.  
 
Despite the rarity of attacks in the UK, terrorism continues to attract much 
government attention and finance justified on the grounds that it symbolically attacks 
the heart of a society’s cultural values, governance processes and structures of law 
and order that allow people to ‘ go about their lives freely with confidence’ 
(HMGovernment, 2011)    
 
A Public Health Approach  
Public health approaches involve close connections with the community, actions at a 
population level and not only through health agencies, but through universal 
interventions that aim to reduce risk factors and promote protective factors in the 
entire population. The purpose is to shift the distribution of risk factors in a 
population to reduce the number of people who are reaching the threshold for 
having significant risks and developing illness. This approach has been applied to 
violence prevention in general (Mikton, Butchart, Dahlberg, & Krug, 2016), and to 
behaviours such as suicide, violence, drug taking,  crime and now also to 
radicalisation and terrorism (Bhui et al., 2012).  
  
A good and relevant example is public health approaches to violence and conflict 
which seek to enact prevention at the earliest opportunity (Sidel & Levy, 2003). 
These initiatives have been applied to violence prevention in general, to teenage 
pregnancy, gun and violent crime, as well as smoking and other societal ills that, if 
unaddressed, consume significant healthcare resources (Henry, Farrell, & Multisite 
Violence Prevention, 2004; Massetti, Holland, & Gorman-Smith, 2016; Mikhail & 
Nemeth, 2016; Mikton et al., 2016).  Suicide is a rare event. Yet identifying and 
reducing risk factors associated with suicide in the general population such as self-
harming behaviours, alcohol and drug misuse, depression, access to means 
(firearms, coal gas) etc., can  plausibly reduce rates. The purpose of a population-
level intervention is to reduce  the population prevalence of a risk factor profile of 
any early indicator,  so reducing the likelihood of meeting the trigger points for 
adverse outcomes. However, to reduce the incidence of radicalisation and violent 
protest, we need to better understand the social and psychological conditions that 
lie on the pathway. Therein lies the dilemma; we do not know enough about the 
pathways and these are likely to be multi-layered and multi-faceted, appealing to 
different groups of vulnerable or susceptible individuals. 
  
 To investigate what radicalisation might look like, as part of a large research 
programme, we worked with local communities to better understand the meaning of 
radicalisation and how to measure it. This culminated in a survey of over 600 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi men and women living in the community. The 
methodology, and detailed analyses are already published and accessible.(K. Bhui, 
Everitt, & Jones, 2014; Ghosh et al., 2013).  Although extremism is not limited to 
South Asian or Muslim heritage populations, these were the groups that were under 
scrutiny and about  whom many of the debates about radicalisation related.  Thus, 
we collected views from community groups to construct a set of questions which 
were later piloted, tested, and refined and included in a survey of Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani men and women. We discovered that people were willing to answer the 
questions, that there were no incidents during our survey and that such work was 
possible. The research enabled us to develop a measure of sympathies for 
radicalisation, and consider the relevance of a number of variables that showed 
correlations with our measure.  
  
 Relevant 
o Relative social isolation 
o Moderate to high social capital 
o Youth 
o Non-migrant status, that is born in UK 
 
 Not relevant 
o Poverty 
o Discrimination 
o Total life events 
o Depressive symptoms measures on a continuous scale using PHQ-9 
o Anxiety measures on GAD-7 
o Religiosity 
  
These findings challenged the prevailing view that feeling oppressed, marginalised or 
being of low income were essential drivers of grievances that then led to anger and 
radicalisation. Of course, although we attempted to recruit a population sample, the 
study is limited to inferences about our specific samples. It is possible that of those 
who progress towards more active involvement, there are additional factors that we 
have not been able to investigate. Taking a public health perspective also meant that 
we should  consider those who were not so emphatic about condemning terrorist 
acts, and thus might be open to persuasion.  We viewed  the spectrum of sympathy 
to condemnation as a continuum, rather than being solely concerned with  those 
actively professing sympathies for violent causes including terrorism. In this manner, 
we found depressive symptoms, and scores above 5 on the PHQ-9 were relevant and 
related to greater sympathy rather than condemnation of such acts. This led us to 
investigate what depressive symptoms might mean and their role (Bhui, Everitt, et 
al., 2014; K. Bhui, Warfa, & Jones, 2014). To what extent was this hopelessness or 
pessimism, leading to a search for meaning and purpose, or was depression  related 
to personality and  not  something  that might come to the attention of 
psychotherapists. We are undertaking further research into which types of 
depressive symptoms are relevant, and comparing white British with Pakistani men 
and women to explore common factors relating to extremism. A recent analysis of 
this data shows that depressive symptoms increase sympathies for violent protest 
and terrorist a little, but surprisingly life events, especially bereavement and giving 
money to a charity, and to a less significant extent, political participation, are 
negatively correlated with sympathies; our interpretation is that social 
connectedness, even if expressed through loss, is protective ( Bhui, Silva, Topciu, & 
Jones, 2016).   
  
Thus relationships and the ability to tackle pessimistic thinking seem important in 
strategies designed to address radicalisation, but so does being part of a community 
and giving to that community. Focusing  on attitudes or psychological constructs as 
targets of deradicalisation might seem an obvious way forward, given the parallels 
with psychological therapies that target cognitive biases. However, there are wider 
social drivers and more internal and collective sacred antecedents that are  not  
readily accessible to psychological interventions. Deradicalisation programmes 
around the world  make use of the social and cultural milieu of the individual and 
their identity group within which psychological or other work can be undertaken. For 
example, see the reports from the Radicalisation Awareness Network 
(https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/310/ran-deradicalisation-
working-group-proposed-policy-recommendations). Indeed, this is also the way 
offender management services operate. However, a population approach takes a 
different perspective, that of intervening early in the natural history of  extreme 
ideologies. It focuses on prevention at a population level, exposing  people to  
counter-narratives tailored  to address  the social drivers and  sources of anger that 
may encourage people to seek empowering  ideologies to give their lives meaning.  
 
 The public health approach  complements  rather than  replaces criminal justice 
agencies, especially if individuals  have joined extreme groups or begun to act in 
ways that support their aims. The public approach  seeks to  provide practical and 
evidence based information to the wider public, so that all can see themselves as 
part of a solution, rather that feel  excluded or even part of a  suspect community. 
Terrorists seek  to provoke a harsh counter-response that reinforces accusations of 
discrimination and  injustice against groups, most prominently against Muslim 
populations and countries in the Middle East. However, thoughtful and measured 
responses are necessary, akin  to what was seen during the Norwegian legal process 
after the Brevik incident.  
 
Apparently random acts of killing, such as the vehicle attacks in Nice, Berlin, London 
and Stockholm naturally raise questions of causation, evoking explanations involving 
psychological processes and mental illness. This emotional debate in a context of 
little objective evidence may heighten  stigma of mental illness and deter those who 
seek help from psychological services. Whilst  the evidence base for terrorist 
involvement or motivations for violence are  sometimes based solely on media 
reports,  for now we know that the majority of incidents have little to do with mental 
illness. Further, the nature of the  psychological processes associated with  
vulnerability to radicalisation and recruitment is yet to be fully determined. This field 
of research and practice is in its infancy and can learn much from the existing 
literature on crime and violence, and experiences of   crime prevention in general.  
The place of psychoanalytic thought lies in not only interrogating the evidence and 
emotional processes of perpetrators, but also the emotional processes of political 
decision makers and victims, the media and the wider public.  
 
Conclusion  
An analysis of media responses to our nuanced population studies showed that the 
press often occupy polarized positions, suggesting that the capacity for emotional 
distortion is high in relation to violence and terrorism. Our studies were based on 
proportional quota sampling of people of Muslim heritage in defined areas and yet 
the finding were interpreted by newspapers as if we had interviewed convicted 
terrorists. Furthermore, there was concern that we were dismissing terrorism as a 
form of mental illness, or that we had ignored accumulated understanding of 
different varieties of terrorism in Northern Ireland and other countries. Strategies to 
reduce the impact of radical messages should be based on an  evolving process of 
gathering information to resist the temptation to reach for a binary position on 
findings and policy implications. Binary thinking is a core challenge we face when 
tackling terrorism, a rejection of possibilities that are not in accord with our own 
precepts. This tendency is seen not only in researchers, practitioners, and experts, 
but also amongst government leaders and politicians.  The notion of preventive 
efforts introduced long before any chance of a commitment to violence seemed 
irrelevant to some at the front line of counter-terrorism for whom the imminent 
threat is the priority. Whilst their legitimate and pressing concern for public safety is 
acknowledged, greater regard should be given to addressing what seems like an 
endless supply of people willing to give their lives to terrorist causes. Drawing on 
writings of (Atran, 2003),  loyalty to intimate cohorts of peers, often promoted 
through religious communion, seem relevant, whilst a search for   meaning and 
purpose may draw  many away from  a secure life with their families towards radical 
extremism. 
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